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I. INTRODUCTION
"Questions of right and wrong are as old as medicine itself... ."1 Care for the
terminally ill is certainly one of the most emotionally charged responsibilities
one might face during his lifetime. Whether an individual chooses medicine as
his occupation or is exposed to medicine (or medical care for the terminally ill)
within his personal life, care for the terminally ill can certainly take a toll on
one's psyche. Some people feel that caring for a person whose life is nearing
an end is a privilege and a gift.2
Perhaps nothing is more devastating than the decision about whether to tell
a patient he has cancer.3 The manner in which one makes disclosures is critical
for the patient and may determine his emotional status and capacity to function
from that point forward.4 However, some people advocate withholding
disclosures from the terminally ill.5 Concealment of diagnoses and prognoses
occur in cases other than those concerning terminal illness; however, such
actions seem to occur most often in cases in which doctors diagnose the patient
with cancer.6 Although some argue for the so-called "therapeutic privilege,"
this author proposes that this privilege should be construed very narrowly and
used only in the rarest of cases.
At one time, the physician's word was akin to that of God.7 "The doctor said"
was pronounced with almost religious conviction.8 Doctors did what they
believed best, and people generally accepted those decisions.9 However, this
belief has recently begun to change due to a new focus on patient autonomy.
1Laura Taxel, Brave New World: Exploring the Relationship Between Medicine and
Morals, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Jan. 9, 1994, at 8.
2 Dallas M. High, Truth Telling, Confidentiality, and the Dying Patient: New Dilemmas
for the Nurse, 24 NURSING FORUM 5, 10 (1989).
3 Donald Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175 JAMA
1120 (1961). Patients have varying reactions to learning that they have a disease that
may or may not be curable. For some people, nothing is more frightening than hearing
the word cancer associated with either themselves or a loved one. Knowledge of such
information brings out expressions of anger, depression, denial or any combination of
such emotions. Id. at 1126. Questions arise regarding the capacity of human beings to
adapt to the expectation of death. Id. at 1125. Some people are driven to fight while
others see the situation as hopeless and give up.
4Oken, supra note 3, at 1125.
5Notes, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1653 (1974)
(hereinafter Notes).
6 Benjamin Freedman, Offering Truth: One Ethical Approach to the Uninformed Cancer
Patient, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 572 (1993).





DOCTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
"'Let's face it,' says [Dr. Stuart] Younger,lO 'Until recently, most physicians have
been white, Protestant males. They did what they thought was best, but what
they thought did not include the traditions, morals and viewpoints of everyone
else."' 11
As early as 1891, the Supreme Court noted that "no right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law."12 "One of the most neglected aspects of the physician-patient
relationship is the right of the patient to be a self-sovereign, autonomous, free
human being."13 When an individual concludes that it is in the "best interest"
of the patient for the physician to lie to that patient, then individual has
decided that the physician, not the patient, is the authority on the "best interest"
of the patient.14 This directly contradicts the premise of autonomous
decision-making by the patient.15
Health care professionals are sometimes reluctant to disclose diagnoses and
prognoses to dying patients.16 "Such protectionism has created what was
known in the '60s and '70s as an environment of "a conspiracy of silence"
directed toward the terminally ill."17 This attitude is not the best situation for
the terminally ill in today's society.18 For most dying persons, hope centers
around the quality of remaining life and a general assessment of life's values. 19
"It is the care provider's moral duty to allow patients to live out their lives as
individuals until they die."20 A person cannot live their life as they wish if they
are not aware of all the facts pertaining to their bodily condition.
10 Dr. Stuart Younger is co-director of the Clinical Ethics Program at University
Hospital of Cleveland and a member of the task force to revise The Encyclopedia of
Bioethics. The encyclopedia serves as guidance when facing moral questions pertaining
to such things as religious objections to medical care, abortion, AIDS, assisted suicide
and fertility measures. The five-volume edition will define the moral dimensions of
modem science, medicine and health care for the 21st century. Id.
1lid. at 17 (citing Dr. Stuart Younger).
12 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
13 David Morris, Truth Telling in Medicine, 247 JAMA 2659 (1982).
141d. "Harm is inflicted upon the patient by undermining his right of
self-determination when information is withheld." Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" To The
Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionmaking, 1979 Wisc. L.REv. 413, 469.
15 See Morris, supra note 13, at 2659.




20 Id. at 9.
19951
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
As patients demand their right to information, evidence suggests that
disclosure is beneficial.2 1 "It is naive to assume that professionals and family
members can successfully conceal awareness of terminal illness from a
patient."22
It is the purpose of this Note to review and evaluate the benefits to making
full disclosure to a terminally ill patient. It is this author's position that a
patient's well-being and dignity dictate that the physician be forthright with
all information regarding a patient's diagnosis and the range of treatments
available, including both active and passive treatments.
II. A DOCTOR'S GENERAL DuTy TO DISCLOSE
A. History and Theory of Informed Consent
Truth telling is essential to informed consent.23 The legal doctrine of
informed consent requires disclosure of information that is material to a
treatment decision before seeking the patient's consent.24 Growing concern
over the compound issue of "full disclosure" has provoked much debate among
health care and legal professionals. 25 Courts developed the informed consent
doctrine to promote the patient's well-being and to protect the patient's right
to self-determination. 26
Respect for autonomy is the most frequently mentioned principle behind the
doctrine of informed consent.27 Many terms such as "privacy," "voluntary,"
"freedom to choose" and "self-mastery" are commonly associated with the
phrase "respect for autonomy."28 The doctrine of informed consent
acknowledges that each person is the master of his or her own body, and that
the patient should make the final treatment decision.29 The doctrine instructs
that competent patients determine what treatment is acceptable to them after
2 1See High, supra note 2, at 6.
2 2 Id.
23 Edmund Pellegrino, Is Truth Telling to the Patient a Cultural Artifact?, 268 JAMA
1734 (1992).
24 Hilda Slive, Informed Consent, 249 JAMA 815 (1983).
25 Dennis H. Novack, et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve
Difficult Ethical Problems, 261 JAMA 2980 (1989). See also Oken, supra note 3, at 1125.
26 G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS, 59 (1975) (noting the modem trend
as viewing the relationship between doctor and patient as a partnership in making
decisions rather than as a monopoly by medical personnel).
2 7RrrH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 7 (1986).
28 Id.
2 9Conny D. Beatty, Comments, Case of No Consent: The DNR Order as a Medical
Decision, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 699, 700 (1987).
[Vol. 43:319
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being informed of the risks and benefits of the treatment offered and the
alternatives that are available.30
1. Elements of Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent includes four essential components.3 1
First, there must be full disclosure of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment and the available alternatives.3 2 Second, the information should be
provided in an easily comprehensible form.33 The third component requires
that the consent be obtained freely and without coercion 34 or undue
influence.35 Finally, the patient must be competent to give his or her consent.3 6
In essence, informed consent consists of the doctor communicating important
information to his patient and the patient consenting to the treatment.
Consent ranks as the most obvious element to "informed consent."
Essentially, consent is an individual's decision to authorize a doctor to perform
a particular medical intervention. 37 Some authors specify three elements of an
autonomous action.38 These elements include intentionality, understanding
and noncontrol.39 The first element is self-explanatory-either a person's act40
is intentional or not. The other two elements are a matter of degree,41 therefore,
they vary from person to person.
The "understanding" element requires that the actor understand his or her
own action.42 This condition has special importance in relation to informed
30Mary E. Rosen, The Do Not Resuscitate Policy Jurisdiction Over Policy and the
Therapeutic Privileges, ABA FORUM COMM. ON HEALTH LAW 3 (Spring/Summer 1990).





"Coercion may take the form of subtle pressure from other individuals,
unconscious motivations, or simple failures to comprehend information in the form in
which it is conveyed." Notes, supra note 5, at 1657.
35 Id.
36Id.
37 Arthur L. Caplan, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, 257 JAMA 386 (1987)
(Book Review). See also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DiCTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE
(David B. Guralnik ed. 1984)(defining consent as 1. permission; approval 2. agreement).
3 8 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 238.
3 9 1d.
40 The patient's act referred to here is that of voluntarily submitting to a proposed
treatment by the physician.
41 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 238.
42Id. at 248.
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consent. Clinical experience has indicated that patients vary in their
understandings of important information about diagnoses, medical
procedures, risks of treatments and prognoses expected. 43 Such things as the
level of calmness exhibited by the patient and any distractions to the patient
affects one's ability to understand.44 Within the realm of autonomy and
informed consent, understanding is viewed as a patient's understanding that
they must consent to or refuse a particular treatment.45 Such consent or refusal
is possible by understanding what that treatment is, through discussions with
the treating physician.46
The element of noncontrol is based on the fundamental principle that
autonomous decisions are made independent of external controls upon a
person.47 A person should be able to exercise their free power of choice, without
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit or duress.48
For consent to be valid, the patient must have been given sufficient
information to understand the nature of the decision that they made.49 The
process of obtaining informed consent must follow specific guidelines.
Although sources of information such as a videotaped presentation or a
discussion with a nurse can be used to supplement what the treating physician
discusses, these secondary sources cannot take the place of an informative
meeting with the primary treating physician. 50 The discussion in the course of
obtaining informed consent should include such information as an explanation
of the technique to be performed, risks involved, benefits and alternatives of
the procedure, and prognosis both with and without treatment.51
In discussing the risks involved, those risks connected to the anesthesia
should also be explained, even though these risks should be covered by the
anesthetist.52 Generally, however, only material risks must be disclosed.53 The
43 Id.
441d.




49 Jeffrey R. Botkin, Informed Consent for Lumbar Puncture, 143 AM. J. OF DISEASES OF
CHILDREN 899 (1989).
5OMarvin F. Kraushar, Informed Consent; Surrender or Salvation?, 104 ARCH.
OPHTHALMOLOGY 352, 353 (1986).
5lid.
52Id.
53 Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.
L.REv. 628, 638 (1970). "Materiality is the keystone of the physician's duty to disclose."
Id. The first task is to assess the risks and determine which ones are material. Id.
[Vol. 43:319
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focus of "materiality" is the importance of the information to the patient. 54
Materiality has two components when analyzing risk:55 probability and
consequence.-% As cited by the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
The materiality of information about a potential injury is a function
not only of the severity of the injury, but also of the likelihood that [the
injury] will occur. Regardless of the severity of a potential injury, if the
probability that the injury will occur is so small as to be practically
nonexistent, then the possibility of that injury occurring cannot be
considered a material factor in a rational assessment of whether to
engage in the activity that exposes one to the potential injury.57
On the other hand, more common lesser risks must also be discussed since
failing to do so leaves the doctor open to liability.58 A patient may allege that
he agreed to the procedure because the serious risks were remote and that with
knowledge of the more common, lesser risks, he would not have given his
consent.59 However, everyday risks such as the possibility of surgery-related
infections, need not be disclosed to the patient.60 There is no need to disclose
risks that either ought to be known by everyone61 or that are in fact known to
the patient because of prior experience with the therapy in question. 62
Furthermore, physicians will be held liable only for non-disclosure of risks
which would be known to a reasonably prudent practitioner.63 "[C]ourts have
repeatedly stated that doctors are not insurers.' 64
2. "Professional" Standard v. "Reasonable Person" Standard for
Disclosure of Information
The duty to disclose can be determined by two different standards. The first
standard, which seems to be the majority, is the "professional" or "medical
54 JonF. Merz, On a Decision-Making Paradigm of Medical Informed Consent, 14J. LEGAL
MED. 231, 233 (1993).
551d.
56Id.
57 precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Mass. 1985).
58 See Kraushar, supra note 50, at 353.
591d.
60 See Notes, supra note 5, at 1637.
61 Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1963).
62 Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982 (Kan. 1964).
631d.
64 Milton Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249,
259 (1962).
1995]
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community" model of physician disclosure.65 Here, a patient's right to know
depends upon whether a reasonable medical practitioner would have
disclosed the information under the same or similar circumstances.66 In other
words, under this standard of disclosure, the doctor need only disclose such
risks that are consistentwith the practice of the local community.67 The doctor's
choice of plausible courses should not be called into question if it appears that
the doctor was motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and
that he proceeded as a competent medical professional would have done in a
similar situation.68
The second standard used to determine disclosure requirements is the
reasonable patient standard. As stated by the court in Canterbury v. Spence,69
"[r]espect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves." 70 "[T]he issue on nondisclosure
must be approached from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the
physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should know to be the
patient's information needs."71 This standard measures a physician's duty to
disclose according to what an objective, "reasonable patient" would consider
to be material to the decision about whether or not to consent to the proposed
treatment. 72 Thus, all risks potentially affecting the patient's decision must be
revealed.73 The reasonable person standard recognized that patient autonomy
is limited, and that there must be tradeoffs which necessarily remove some
choice from the individual.74
Proponents of the reasonable person standard believe that the primary
purpose of the informed consent doctrine is further promoted by focusing on
a patient's need to obtain information pertinent to decision-making. 75 As stated
65 Halle F. Terrion, Informed Choice: Physician's Duty to Disclose Non-Readily Available
Alternatives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 491 (1993); see also Metz, supra note 54.
66 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093,1106 (Kan. 1960). See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957).
67 See Notes, supra note 5, at 1637.
68Tatro v. Lueken, 512 P.2d 529, 537 (Kan. 1973).
69464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064.
701d. at 784.
711d. at 787.
721d. at 786 (measuring the scope of doctor's communication to the patient by the
patient's need).
731d. at 787.
74 See Beatty, supra note 29, at 711.
75Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (Md. 1977).
[Vol. 43.'319
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in Canterbury, the patient's right to decide whether to undergo a proposed
therapy "is at the very foundation of the duty to disclose."76
In viewing the "professional" standard, there is strong argument that this test
runs contrary to the vesting of ultimate determination of treatment questions
in the patient.77 The patient's right to select treatment is limited due to the fact
that it is based only on information deemed necessary to disclose according to
the medical community.78 So, although it may be in only the minority of
jurisdictions, the reasonable person standard seems more logical to the
promotion of the basis of informed consent.
B. What Type Of Information Must Be Disclosed?
Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital79 is ordinarily viewed as one of the
earliest cases involving the physician's duty to disclose information in order to
obtain informed consent. Justice Cardozo made the historical statement
"[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body... ."80 Since that time, there have been
many opinions about what exactly must be disclosed to constitute an informed
consent.81 Generally, the current legal standard requires the physician to
disclose to the patient his diagnosis, the prognosis with and without the
proposed treatment, and the alternatives for treatment, including the risks and
benefits of each alternative.82 The necessity and extent of disclosure by a
physician can be summarized by the following rules:
[I]n order to assure that an informed consent is obtained, the physician
must make the disclosures necessary to form the basis of such a
consent, but the duty of the physician is limited to those disclosures
which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same
or similar circumstances. The nature and extent of the disclosure
depends upon the medical problem as well as upon the patient. It has
76 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
77See Notes, supra note 5, at 1638.
781d.
79105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
801d. at 93.
81justice Cardozo's sentiment was further expressed in a report by the PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP
Washington D.C., 1982. The report states that even if no legal doctrine of informed
consent existed, the moral imperative of preserving the individual's right to choose what
happens to his or her body would mandate faithful compliance with the principle of
informed consent. WILLIAMJ. CURRANET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 314 (4th ed. 1990).
82 See Botkin, supra note 49, at 899.
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been suggested that some disclosures may so disturb the patient that
they serve as hindrances to needed treatment, and certain disclosures
in some instances may even be bad medical practice.
83
The requirement of disclosing prognosis information to terminally ill
patients ranks as one of the most controversial topics within this area.
"Prognosis" is defined as "a prediction," especially in the course of a disease.84
A therapeutic privilege not to disclose information when it may be harmful to
the patient has been recognized.85 Some believe prognosis information can be
detrimental to the patient, especially where terminal illness is concerned.
However, the patient's express purpose for employing the services of the
doctor may dictate whether or not certain information can be withheld.
In one situation, the patient comes to the doctor specifically for the purpose
of gaining the advantage of a diagnosis and prognosis for informational
purposes only.86 Here, the patient, in coming to a particular specialist, is asking
for a precise diagnosis and prognosis.87 Although the doctor could decline the
employment offered by the patient, if he proceeds, "he must realize that the
giving of information [good or bad] has been made the essence of his
engagement."88 Often, such services are engaged as a basis for arranging
personal affairs upon notice of "the worst possible facts about one's physical
condition."89 As rare as it may be, in such a situation, the doctor has a duty to
disclose the information once he has entered upon the undertaking.
A more complex situation occurs when the patient engages the doctor to treat
him, and the diagnosis comes secondary to that end.90 In such cases, many
argue that the privilege to withhold information should apply because
"[sludden disclosure of a dread[ed] disease may cause tremendous
repercussions in the patient."91 In most situations where the privilege would
not apply, the doctor should also disclose the patient's diagnosis and prognosis
to constitute full disclosure.
83 Tatro, 512 P.2d at 538 (citing 61 AM.JUR.2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc., § 154 (1981)).
84 WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (David B.
Guralnik ed. 1984). Prognosis is also defined as the foretelling of the probable course of
a disease. STEDMAN'S POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 612 (William R. Hensyl ed. 1987).
85 See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
86Hubert W. Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis From Patient
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C. The Therapeutic Privilege to Informed Consent
In addition to holding that the appropriate standard for disclosure was a
patient-centered standard as opposed to the professional standard, the court
in Canterbury recognized the "therapeutic privilege" exception to the disclosure
of risk information.92 This exception is "a recognition that as important as is
the patient's right to know, it is greatly outweighed by the magnitudinous
circumstances giving rise to the privilege."93 This privilege applies when
risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the patient that it becomes
unfeasible or inadvisable from a medical point of view.94
It is acknowledged that patients occasionally become so ill or emotionally
distraught upon disclosure of medical information so as to foreclose a rational
decision, or complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose
psychological damage to the patient.95 One court specifically suggested that
information may be properly withheld from the patient if its disclosure "might
induce an adverse psychosomatic96 reaction in a patient highly apprehensive
of his condition."97 One strong supporter of the privilege wrote,
To tell the patient the truth and the whole truth often causes violent
psychological reactions to the patient and an undermining of morale
without any countervailing gain. In the ordinary case, it may indeed
be negligent medical practice to worsen the patient's condition and to
destroy or impair his chances of recovery by such injudicious
disclosures.
98
According to the Canterbury court, the critical inquiry in application of the
privilege is whether the doctor showed sound medical judgment in deciding
92464 F.2d at 789.
93 1d. at 788. The court did acknowledge the fact that even if the privilege applies to
the situation, the doctor should attempt to secure a relative's consent if possible. Id. at
789. In fact, the Italian Deontology Code, written by the Italian Medical Association
included the following statement: "A serious or lethal prognosis can be hidden from the
patient, but not from the family." Antonella Surbone, Letter From Italy: Truth Telling to
the Patient, 268 JAMA 1661 (1992).
94464 F.2d at 789. See also Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PmTT. L. REV. 407, 444 (1980).
95 464 F.2d at 789.
96 The term psychosomatic is used to refer to the relationship between the
psychological and the physiological. Bradford Wixon, Therapeutic Deception, 13
J.LEG.MED. 77 (1992). In recent years, there has accumulated convincing evidence that
the immune system, along with other organs and systems in the body, can be influenced
by the mind. See MIND BODY MEDICINE, infra note 247, at 4.
97 Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 121 (Haw. 1970).
98 Smith, supra note 86, at 354. Another supporter, in writing an article favoring the
therapeutic privilege, dedicated his work to his father-in-law, who "might likely have
lived longer, had his physicians offered him hope." Wixon, supra note 96, at 77.
1995]
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that communication of risk information would present a threat to the patient's
well-being.99 The doctor should assess the risks and benefits of truth telling on
the basis of current scientific knowledge, rather than on folklore or his own
personal discomfort.100 The court continued by stating that a doctor is not
privileged to withhold information from a patient merely because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego the therapy which the doctor believes the
patient needs. 101 This may especially apply in the situation of a terminally ill
patient. Upon disclosure that the patient's condition has become terminal,
oftentimes cancer patients choose to forego any further chemotherapy
treatments and concentrate on the quality of the time they have left.102 If a
doctor withholds prognosis information which suggests a terminal illness
simply because he believes the patient will forego the proposed treatment or
choose another alternative, the doctor will be liable for non-disclosure and held
responsible for damages.1l 3
D. Damages For Failure to Disclose
Originally, a claim for lack of informed consent sounded in battery.104
Battery law provides that a defendant may be liable for all injury caused by
tortious touching.1O Such a claim gives rise to compensatory damages, which
"represent the amount of the pecuniary injury actually suffered[,]" as well as
punitive damages, which are "designed to punish and deter intentional wrong
doing."106 Absent any physical injury, nominal damages may be assessed for
an insult suffered.107
Although informed consent claims originated in battery, the courts soon
recognized the claim 108 as one arising in negligence.109 In the great majority of
99464 F.2d at 789. Some believe that discussion with the patient's family can be
utilized to ascertain whether risk-disclosure to the patient will, in fact, seriously interfere
with the patient's decision-making capacity. See Meisel, supra note 14, at 466.
100 Maxwell Boverman, Truth Telling in Medicine, 248 JAMA 1307 (1982).
10 1Id. See also, Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 703 (S.C. 1984).
102 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
103 See Boverman, supra note 100.
10 4A battery is an intentional and wrongful physical contact with a person without
his or her consent that entails some injury or offensive touching. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 104 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
10 5See Merz, supra note 54, at 233.
10 6See Oppenheim, supra note 64, at 249.
10 7See Merz, supra note 54, at 233.
10 8A typical claim regarding informed consent might read as follows:
[Dr.] failed and omitted to give the plaintiff sufficient facts and informa-
tion concerning the procedure so that the plaintiff could reasonably decide
whether he was willing to undergo the surgical procedure; [Dr.] failed and
[Vol. 43:319
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American jurisdictions, an action is based in negligence.110 If the patient would
not have consented to the operation or treatment had he been warned of a
consequence, and the consequence actually occurred, then the action is for
malpractice.111 As one writer said, "[t]he fundamental distinction between
ordinary assault and battery and medical negligence such as would constitute
malpractice, is that the former is intentional and the latter unintentional."112
Under a negligence theory, a successful suit will depend on the plaintiff's
ability to demonstrate five key elements in an informed consent case: (1) the
physician's duty owed to the patient to provide information; (2) breach of the
physician's duty; (3) harm suffered by the patient; (4) the relation of the harm
to the development of an undisclosed risk; and (5) evidence that had the patient
been informed of the risk, he or she would not have consented to the
procedure.113
In Natanson v. Kline, the court stated in dicta that the measure of damages for
failure to secure an informed consent is the loss 114 resulting from the risk which
materialized, whether or not the therapy was performed carefully.115
In addition to proving a loss due to the doctor's malpractice, a plaintiff in a
suit for damages based on lack of informed consent must establish proximate
causation between the asserted breach of duty and the resultant injury. In the
event that the plaintiff can fulfill the key elements in an informed consent case,
and no exception to the doctrine applies, the plaintiff may recover if he or she
proves the necessary causation.
omitted to inform the plaintiff of the risks and/or alternatives of the said
surgical procedure.
See Kraushar, supra note 50, at 353.
109Id.
110John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of Plhysicians
to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R. 4TH 900 (1985).
Basically, the only exceptions where a battery action may still be brought are situations
where the procedure is forced upon the patient without any consent, or where the
consent is fraudulently obtained and the fraud relates to the character of the touching.
See Curran, supra note 81, at 304.
1 11Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 502 (Ariz. 1978).
1 12See Oppenheim, supra note 64, at 259.
113See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 23-49.
114Some losses which might be asserted in a damage action are loss of enjoyment of
life and lost wages. See Beatty, supra note 29, at 712.
115350 P.2d at 1107 (holding that an issue for the jury to determine should be whether
the administration of cobalt irradiation treatment was given with the informed consent
of the patient, and if informed consent was not given, the doctor who failed in his legal
obligation is guilty of malpractice no matter how skillfully the treatment may have been
administered, and the jury should determine the damages arising from the irradiation
treatment).
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III. CONDITIONS THAT MANDATE DIscLOSURE AND CONDMONS THAT
RECOMMEND CAUTION
Conditions that require disclosure vary from patient to patient. The most
obvious example of a situation which warrants disclosure is when the patient
specifically asks for his diagnosis and/or prognosis. If a patient asks for her
diagnosis or prognosis, she certainly wants to know the results and deserves
to know them.116 Patients know their limits better than anyone else and if they
ask for the results, it is usually because they feel they can handle it. Also, it is
often thought that patients who ask for a prognosis suspect their illness is
serious,117 and the process of "wondering" whether or not it is serious is often
even more stressful than hearing the "bad news." Denial of death within our
society has made many people unable to appreciate that a dying person may
accept the prospect of death "with equanimity and without mental
disturbance."118
While medical providers have a duty to provide information to patients who
ask, there are some situations where caution is recommended. The most
obvious example of such a situation is when a patient has expressly voiced
suicidal intentions. One writer 119 used the following example: A woman had
a lump in her breast which was medically recognizable as cancer. She went to
a reputable surgeon in a rather distraught frame of mind. At the outset of the
interview, she told the surgeon that if she had cancer she would commit
suicide.12 0 Due to the psychological condition of the patient and her threat of
self-destruction, the surgeon told her she had a tumor that needed to be
removed but did not specify that the tumor was cancerous. 12 1 The patient was
successfully treated but when she subsequently found out that it had been
cancerous, she brought a claim for malpractice. 122 In reply, it was asserted that
her own threats of self-destruction raised a therapeutic privilege to withhold
the true facts in her case.123 As rare as this situation may be, this author believes
116Surprisingly, the majority of doctors in one survey felt that almost all patients really
do not want to know about their illness, regardless of what they say when asked. See
Oken, supra note 3, at 1123. Interestingly enough, the same survey showed that the
doctors would want to be told the whole truth, if they themselves were the patients. Id.
at 1125.
117 Some believe it is naive to assume that professionals and family members can
successfully conceal awareness of a terminal illness from a patient. See High, supra note
2, at6.
118 E. KUBLER Ross, ON DEATH & DYING 112-137 (1969).




123See Smith, supra note 86, at 355.
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that the privilege should be strictly construed and allowed only in such limited
situations.
A. Therapeutic Privilege as a Defense to Medical Malpractice
'When an exception to the informed consent doctrine is properly invoked,
the physician is relieved of either his duty of disclosure, or his duty of obtaining
consent from the patient, or both."124 The basic canons of malpractice must be
recorded: the doctor must behave as a reasonable doctor and as a reasonable
person.125
In Cobbs v. Grant, the court established an objective test for causation that
holds the doctor liable only if the trier of fact decides that a reasonable person
in the patient's position would have refused the treatment when adequately
informed.126 Some evidence demonstrates that courts may closely analyze a
doctor's invocation of the privilege of therapeutic deception127 as a defense.128
For this reason, a doctor would be well advised not to rely upon this defense
unless the patient's mental condition and the harm disclosure would cause are
well documented.129
For a doctor to be sure he is complying with the legal doctrine of informed
consent, he should always ask the patient two questions following his
discussion of the proposed treatment.130 First, he should ask the patient
whether he understands the procedure or therapy that was discussed. 131
Second, the patient should also be asked whether he has any questions
regarding the material discussed. 132 Asking these questions and receiving the
appropriate responses will help to protect the doctor from any later claim by
the patient that he was hurried through the decision and not given an oppor-
124 See Meisel, supra note 14, at 470.
125 See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 53, at 649-650.
126502 P.2d 1, 11-12 (1972).
127Deception has been defined by one writer as not involving direct lying, but
involving "evasive ormisleading statements which are nonetheless true." Mark Sheldon,
Truth Telling in Medicine, 247 JAMA 651, 652 (1982) (Special Communications Section)
(quoting Ellin, J., Lying & Deception, WESTMINSTER INST. REV., 3-6 (1981)).
128Richard E. Shugre & Kathryn Linstromberg, 77w Practitioner's Guide to Informed
Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 881, 907 (1991).
12 9Id. To document a patient's high susceptibility to anxiety, confirmation of the
doctor's observations by another medical person and/or a relative or close friend of the
patient should be sought and entered on the patient's treatment record. Id. at 907. For
an interesting overview of malpractice defenses, see Michael J. Farrell, Medication
Malpractice: Claims, Culprits and Defenses, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 65 (1992).
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tunity to fully consider the facts presented. 133 As added security, the doctor
might give the patient some period of time, perhaps a day or so depending on
the circumstances surrounding the illness or injury, to think about and process
all the information he has received. Obviously, this is not possible in emergency
situations, but "[tihe right of action to recover for medical malpractice based
on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving
non-emergency treatment...."134
B. Others' Ability to Cause Non-disclosure to Patients
There are often times when various family members, such as spouses or
parents, may wish to withhold information from a patient. Such individuals
assume a terminally ill person will believe what they hear, rather than
acknowledge the signals they receive from their own bodies.135 This often
causes an ethical dilemma for the practitioner: a contrast between the duty to
respect the family's wishes versus the duty to tell the truth to the patient. 136
Often, family members, especially parents, are devastated when they are told
that the patient has a chronic or fatal disease.137 In some cases, family members
agree not to tell anyone and to refuse to allow the health care professionals to
disclose the diagnosis and/or prognosis to the patient.138 This often causes
stress not only to the doctor, but also to the other health care professionals
involved in the patient's treatment. 139 Decisions about disclosure must be
made by considering the specific details of the case, taking into account such
considerations as physician factors, disease-specific factors, patient factors and
family factors. 140
Perhaps the greatest physician factor is that physicians differ in their
approaches to disclosure decisions. For some, the therapeutic privilege is a
justifiable alternative to full disclosure.141 Other doctors feel that any deception
13 31d.
134 See Meisel & Kabnick, supra note 94, at 446 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2805-d(2) (McKinney 1977)).
135See High, supra note 2, at 8.
13 6Garry Sigman, M.D., Disclosure of a Diagnosis to Children and Adolescents When
Parents Object, 147 AM. J. OF DIsEASES OF CHILDREN 764 (1993).
13 71d.
13 81d. at 765.
13 9See infra notes 241-246 and accompanying text.
1405ee Sigman, supra note 136, at 765.
141According to one study, "a vast majority of doctors feel that almost all patients
really do not want to know regardless of what [they] say." See Oken, supra note 3, at
1123. '"hey approach the issue with the view that disclosure should be avoided unless
there are positive indications, rather than the reverse." Id.
[Vol. 43:319
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toward the patient is wrong under any circumstances.1 42 This is often an
expression of the doctor's personal values derived from religious, social and
familial influences. 143 These physician factors have a definite effect on
disclosures made over a family member's objection.
Disease-specific factors also affect whether a physician will disclose
information when requested by others not to disclose.144 "A strong argument
for disclosure exists if a [patient's] knowledge of the disease positively affects
its course and prognosis.145 Diseases such as diabetes mellitus and severe cystic
fibrosis are diseases requiring much self-care, and survival would be unlikely
without a patient's knowledge of the disease and continuation of daily
self-care. 146 Also, the duty to disclose to the patient, over family objections,
increases as the potential threat to the public increases.147 Some diseases, such
as Human Immunodeficiency Virus and hepatitis B, cannot be hidden because
of the potential for unwitting transmission.
Patient-specific factors can also have some effect on a physician's disclosure
of information to that patient. One such factor is age.148 As a young adult
matures he has increasing "moral authority to think, speak and act for
himself."149 This advancing maturity of the patient raises the value of the
patient's right to know personal information regarding his illness above a
parent's right to control that information. 150 Also, the doctor must consider the
history and examination of the patient and decide whether the patient is at a
high risk for psychiatric symptoms before making any and all disclosures.151
Finally, the physician should consider family factors in determining whether
or not to abide by the family's request for non-disclosure. Obviously, cultural
backgrounds and beliefs differ from family to family.152 "Families differ in how,
when and where they make decisions.' 153 Physicians must evaluate and
142A doctor's decision to deceive a patient may threaten the patient's trust and the
quality of their physician-patient relationship. Dennis H. Novack, M.D., et al.,
Physicians' Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve Difficult Ethical Problems, 261
JAMA 2980 (1989).
143 See Sigman, supra note 136, at 766.
1441d.
1 4 5 Id.
146 See Sigman, supra note 136, at 766.
1471d.
1481d.
1 4 9 1d.
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respect the decision-making process in families when faced with dilemmas
regarding disclosure issues.154 However, especially in the case of minor
patients, there have been limits on the ability of the family to make medical
decisions which may not be in the patient's best interest.155
Decisions regarding truth telling are case specific and should be continually
revised as the clinical situation changes.156 For example, patients who are
diagnosed with a chronic disease when they are very young can, in some
situations, justifiably have information withheld from them due to their
immaturity. However, as the patient grows and matures, the numerous factors
involving disclosure must be re-evaluated to determine whether or not the
non-disclosure is still justified.
C. Doctors' View to Disclosure of the Fatality of Diseases
Physicians, by virtue of their responsibility for medical judgments are,
partly by choice and partly by default, charged with the responsibility
of makin ethical judgments which [they] are sometimes ill-equipped
to make. 1
7
Although there are legitimate scholastic issues involved in a doctor's
decision-making, it is anything but an academic situation to the doctor, the
patient and his family.158 Doctors, however, often become involved.159
Doctors handle the disclosure of "bad news" in a variety of ways. They either
avoid the whole issue of death and dying, are upfront with the patient and tell
them anything they want to know, or force upon the patient all known
information in an attempt to avoid later litigation. 160
Evidence suggests that non-disclosure to dying patients is a usual practice
among doctors.161 Strong believers in the therapeutic privilege feel that a dying
patient would be shocked, depressed, or otherwise adversely affected if he
were given the facts.162 Others feel that the patient commonly knows he is
dying anyway.163
154 See Sigman, supra note 136, at 767.
1 551d. at 764.
15 61d. at 768.
15 7Karen Teel, The Physican's Dilemma - A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27
BAYLOR L.REv. 6, 8 (1975).
1581d. at 9.
1 5 9 1d.
160 See Surbone, supra note 93, at 1661.
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One preliminary survey intimates that the majority of
physician-respondents are inclined to use deception in at least some situations
when confronted by conflicting moral values.164 This is very important because
a doctor's decision to use deception will effect patient trust and the quality of
physician-patient relationships. 165 In answering the questions concerning their
attitudes and practices, the majority of the respondents believed that their
patients did not expect them to use deception and that they never or rarely used
deception with their patients.166
In an effort to be kind, helpful and positive, doctors frequently 167 deceive
patients as to their true beliefs.1 68 There are many forms of deception, such as
actively deceiving another by lying or using vague speech.169 One can also
passively deceive via nondisclosure by allowing someone else to deceive the
patient or by failing to correct a misconception. 170
Some doctors may deceive via avoidance for their own benefit. Physicians
may benefit from self-deception, as in believing that it is too uncomfortable for
dying patients to discuss end-of-life issues, when it is really too uncomfortable
for the doctors themselves. 171 In another study used to determine whether or
not doctors disclosed a diagnosis of cancer to their patients, there was found a
strong general tendency to withhold such information. 172 For those in the
minority who chose the "tell often" option in the survey, there was a tendency
to tell the patient that he had a "tumor," with rigid avoidance of specifications
such as cancer and malignancy.173 Such words were almost never used unless
the patient was persistent in his questioning and the doctor had no choice.174
164 See Novack, supra note 142, at 2983.
1651d. at 2980. Physicians were asked an open-ended question pertaining to their basic
principles regarding their use of deception toward patients. Id. at 2983. One participant
in this survey answered the questions regarding principles as follows: "... the only basic
policy is first to do no harm. Honesty is usually the best policy." Id.
166 See Novack, supra note 142, at 2983.
167Although doctors may frequently deceive their patients, they still believe that their
patients do not expect them to use deception. Id.
168 See Novack, supra note 142, at 2984.
169Id.
17OId.
171 See Novack, supra note 142, at 2984.
172See Oken, supra note 3, at 1122.
173 d. at 1123.
174Id.
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One system used by many doctors was to tell as little as possible in the most
general terms that still encouraged cooperation by the patient.175 "Many
approach the issue with the view that disclosure should be avoided unless there
are positive indications [for] disclosure"176 such as emotional stability and an
expressed interest to know the information.
All doctors who believed non-disclosure was the better alternative stated "a
single major goal: maintenance of hope."177 When interviewed, they stated
their determined purpose as "bolster[ing] the patient's hope."' 78 Some doctors
stated that knowledge of cancer is "a death sentence."179 This pessimism
toward such diseases is apparent in society in general and among doctors
themselves.180 The general feeling is that doctors "can do very little to save lives
and not a great deal to prevent suffering."181 There is a great amount of
frustration associated with waiting "helplessly," while a patient is facing a fatal
illness.182 "In matters of life and death, [one's] personal [observations are] far
too likely to be subject to personal unconscious distortions."183
The flip side to non-disclosure by doctors is excessive disclosure of
information to the patient. To some doctors, every patient is a potential
adversary.184 Hence, they may "communicate vast amounts of complicated
information to unprepared patients purely out of fear of litigation."185 This
"result[s] in exhaustive lists of information that will not improve the
[doctor] -patient relationship."186 It leaves the patient feeling confused and may
cause him to forego some treatment that has only minor, remote risks and a
high success rate. This is not truly informed consent since the patient is not
really "informed." More likely than not, he is just scared and confused.
There is also evidence to suggest that fear of litigation causes what has
become known as defensive medicine. Defensive medicine is "unnecessary
1751d. Though, most doctors surveyed agreed that some family member should be









183see Oken, supra note 3, at 1127.
184WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 313 (4th ed. 1990).
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medical care prescribed [by the physician] solely to avoid malpractice
claims."187 The American Medical Association has estimated defensive
medicine to cost almost $25 billion per year.188 This is a complex issue since
fear of litigation is only one of its causes.189 "The cost of defensive medicine is
uncertain, and [any] benefits to patient health and safety are usually
overlooked."190
IV. CASE ExAMPLE: ARATO V. AVEDON
One recent paradigmatic case of informed consent and full and fair
disclosure is Arato v. Avedon. 191 This case proceeded through the California
state court system, culminating with the September 30, 1993 opinion from the
California Supreme Court.
A. Factual and Procedural History
Miklos Arato underwent surgery to remove a non-functioning kidney on
July 21, 1980.192 During surgery, a tumor was discovered in the tail of his
pancreas. 193 Upon an assessment by a fellow colleague which concurred in the
judgment of Mr. Arato's doctor that the tumor should be removed, the situation
was explained to Mr. Arato's wife and she consented to the additional
surgery.194 The excised specimen of tissue was sent to a pathologist for
examination. 195 Several days later, the surgeon informed the Aratos that the
tumor was in fact malignant.196 Mr. and Mrs. Arato were not informed that this
type of tumor tends to spread easily.19 7








19511 Cal. Rptr.2d 169 (1992). Later that day, the surgeon metwith Mr. and Mrs. Arato,
described the surgical procedure performed, stated that he believed the tumor was
cancerous, and explained that the findings would be forthcoming from the pathologist.
Id.
196 Malignant is defined as: 1. Resistant to treatment; occurring in severe form, and
frequently fatal; tending to become worse and lead to an ingravescent course. STEDMAN'S
POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 432 (William R. Hensyl ed. 1987).
19711 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
1995]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
One month after his surgery, the Aratos met with Dr. Avedon, the oncologist
to whom they were referred by Mr. Arato's surgeon.198 Dr. Avedon proposed
a form of therapy consisting of chemotherapy with a combination of drugs
known as F.A.M.199 and radiation treatments. 200 Upon explanation, Mr. Arato
decided to go ahead with the proposed therapy.201
While filling out the initial paperwork at the oncologist's office, Mr. Arato
indicated 202 that he wanted to be told the truth about his illness if he should
become seriously ill in the future.203
Nine months after Mr. Arato's surgery, upon receipt of some test results, Dr.
Avedon formed the opinion that it was highly likely that Mr. Arato had a
recurrence of the cancer.204 It was Dr. Avedon's opinion that Mr. Arato's
reasonable life expectancy would be short, measurable in months. 205 Dr.
Avedon did not share this information with Mr. Arato-he simply said that the
test results suggested a recurrence of the disease.206
Two months later, Mr. Arato was admitted to the hospital where it was
conclusively determined that his cancer had recurred and that he was beyond
cure.207 Upon a brief discussion in which Mr. Arato was told his disease was
no longer curable, Mr. Arato asked, "Where do we go from here?" 208 Dr. Avedon
19811 Cal. Rptr.2d at 171. Dr. Avedon informed the Aratos that there was a significant
chance that the surgery to remove the tumor had not cured the disease and that Mr.
Arato was at great risk for a recurrence. Id. The doctor continued by saying that if he
should develop some recurrence, it would mean his disease was not cured, and that at
this point his disease would then be incurable. Id.
19 9
"F.A.M." is a treatment employing a combination of drugs, which when used in
conjunction with radiation therapy, has shown promise in treating pancreatic cancer in
experimental trials. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 600 (Cal. 1993).
20011 Cal. Rptr.2d at 171. The doctor explained that F.A.M. had demonstrated to be
effective on some forms of pancreatic cancer but he also explained that there was the
risk that this therapy would have no benefit at all. Id.
201/d.
202 Mr. Arato indicated his preference to be told the full truth via both a written
questionnaire and verbal statements. Id.
20311 Cal. Rptr.2d at 172. Upon reviewing the pathology report, Dr. Avedon was of
the opinion that it was highly likely that Mr. Arato would die of this disease and that
he would probably live less than five years. Id. Dr. Avedon, however, did not convey
this information to Mr. Arato since he had not specifically questioned him about a time
frame. Id. Along with three other doctors, Dr. Avedon, provided chemotherapy and
radiation therapy to Mr. Arato. Id. None of these doctors provided Mr. Arato with life
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said they could try to make things better so that he might have some good time
ahead.209 At this point, Mr. Arato indicated 210 that he no longer wanted to
discuss the situation.
Dr. Avedon then met with Mrs. Arato, told her about his conversation with
her husband and expressed his view that Mr. Arato did not want to be further
informed about his condition.211 At this point, Mrs. Arato determined that her
husband should be given no further information about his condition.212 Mr.
Arato was discharged two weeks later, was at home for approximately two
weeks and then was rehospitalized.213 He died four days later, just more than
a year after his surgery that resulted in the removal of a tumor from his
pancreas. 214
Mrs. Arato, along with her two adult children, brought an action against the
surgeon and the four doctors involved in Mr. Arato's chemotherapy and
radiation therapy.215 The plaintiff's theory was that the defendant doctors had
breached their fiduciary duty to make a full and fair disclosure of all facts which
materially affected Mr. Arato's rights and interests.216 Plaintiffs claimed that
had they known Mr. Arato's true condition, they would have conducted their
business and personal affairs differently.217 It was contended that Mr. Arato
might have chosen to forego the time-consuming and painful chemotherapy
had he known that the common life expectancy with such a disease was so
short.218
At trial, there was extensive expert testimony regarding disclosure to a
patient of life expectancy information.2 19 The jurors were instructed and asked
only to decide whether defendant doctors had disclosed all relevant
information to enable Mr. Arato to make an informed decision regarding the




"Mr. Arato waved Dr. Avedon away." Id. at 172.
2 111d.








22011 Cal. Rptr.2d at 173.
22 1Id. 'The jury found (1) none of the defendants 'negligent in the medical
management of the deceased, and (2) that defendants' disclosed to decedent ... all
1995]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
B. Appellate Court Discussion
On appeal, the Court of Appeals emphasized the prior California Supreme
Court case of Cobbs v. Grant.222 The court in Cobbs reasoned that in many
instances, the particular treatment to be undertaken seems evident to the
physician but that it is the patient's prerogative, not the doctor's, to determine
for himself the direction in which he believes his interests to lie.223 Furthermore,
"[t]o enable the patient to chart his course knowledgeably, reasonable
familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes
essential."224
The California Supreme Court in Cobbs strongly rejected the medical
community standard for determination of what constitutes a full disclosure.225
The court continued by saying that once the doctor has disclosed the required
information, the weighing of these risks rests with the patient.226 As stated in
Cobbs, ". t. evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the
patient alone. "22 7
The appellate court in Arato held that without information concerning the
characteristics of the specific kind of cancer involved, including its affect on the
patient during its progression, there was no way for the patient to intelligently
assess any information provided.228 This seems especially true where the
treatment has significant side effects and an extraordinary low probability of
success. 229 The court reasoned that when a patient has requested the truth, the
doctor does him an injustice by withholding precise, specialty information.230
A divided Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, and
ordered a new trial.231 The Supreme Court of California granted the
defendant's ensuing petition for review.232
relevant information which would have enabled [Mr. Arato] to make an informed
decision regarding the proposed treatment to be rendered him." Id. at 173.
222502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972).
2231d. at 10.
2 2 4 Id.
225Id.
226502 P.2d at 10.
227/d.
22811 Cal. Rptr.2d at 177.
229Id.
230 Id. at 178. Here, the court acknowledged that very often patients receive
information and misinformation from other, unreliable sources. Id. The doctor would
do well to communicate the correct information to the patient so that the patient isn't
confused by all the "helpful" information offered by friends, family and co-workers.
23 1Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
23 2Arato, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d at 182.
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C. Supreme Court of California's Discussion
"The Supreme Court reviewed the ruling of a divided Court of Appeals that,
in recommending chemotherapy and radiation to a patient suffering from a
virulent form of cancer, the treating physicians breached their duty to obtain
the patient's informed consent by failing to disclose his statistical life
expectancy."233 The Supreme Court held that due to the variations among
doctor-patient interactions and the intimacy of the relationship itself, it was
unwise to require as a matter of law that certain types of information be
disclosed.234 The court refused to ratify the mandatory disclosure of life
expectancy probabilities. 235 The court suggested that the better rule was to
instruct the jury that a physician is under a legal duty to disclose to the patient
all material information.236 The court refused to require the disclosure of
information that may or may not be indicated in a given context. 237 Rather,
they chose to leave the ultimate judgment regarding the factual adequacy of a
challenged disclosure to the jury operating under the appropriate legal
instructions. 238
The Supreme Court determined that the evidence more than sufficiently
supported the jury's decision that the doctors reasonably disclosed information
material to Mr. Arato's decision regarding whether or not to proceed with the
proposed treatments. 239 For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the
judgment of the trial court.240
An analysis of the Arato's situation is instructive. Although there was
testimony that the Aratos were informed that cancer of the pancreas is usually
fatal, this is not sufficient. There are many different types of cancer, and the
lethality of each varies dramatically. Therefore, simply telling the patient that
his cancer is incurable, without providing some general information
concerning the virulence of the specific cancer at issue, is completely without
meaning, according to this Court.
23 3Arato, 858 P.2d 598.
234 1d. at 606.
23 51d. at 607. The court stated that without exception, every expert witness confirmed
that "statistical morbidity values derived from the experience of population groups are
inherently unreliable and offer little assurance regarding the fate of the individual
patient." Id.
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V. PROPOSITION: FULL DISCLOSURE TO THE PATIENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED,
EXCEPT IN THE RAREST OF CASES, BUT SHOULD BE DISCLOSED
IN THE MOST SENSITIVE WAY AND FOLLOWED-UP WITH
SUPPORTIVE CARE AND THERAPY
The therapeutic privilege should be strictly construed and exercised only in
the rarest cases in which the patient has expressed self-destructive intentions.
The physician's obligation is to present medical facts accurately and to make
recommendations to the patient which are in line with good medical
practice.241 By withholding information, the doctor is not painting an accurate
picture of the patient's situation. It is not always clear that being emotionally
upset necessarily inhibits one's ability to participate in rational
decision-making.242 Physicians have the difficult and sometimes painful
obligation to participate in and encourage the education of their patients, and
this often involves truth-telling.243
There is increasing evidence that open and trustworthy communication
between the doctor and patient adds significantly to the dying patient's quality
of life and sense of well-being.244 Some researchers have discovered that some
of the most satisfied patients in a cancer care program were those who said they
had been given the most accurate information about their diagnosis and
treatment.245 Conversely, patients who reported receiving little or no
information were the least satisfied.246 A study conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates, for the President's Commission in 1982, confirms that doctors are
becoming much more open to the disclosure of information, including "bad
news," than they were twenty years ago.247 However, this increase in the
number of disclosures may raise new problems such as the problem of blunt
and insensitive disclosures.248
2 41See Slive, supra note 24, at 815.
2 42See Meisel, supra note 14, at 466-467.
2 43See Sheldon, supra note 127, at 169.
24 4See High, supra note 2, at 6.
24 5Cori Vanchieri, Satisfaction Highest Among Patients Told the Truth, 85 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 1280 (1993).
246Id.
24 7See High, supra note 2, at 7.
248Id. In order to avoid a disturbance to the patient, while at the same time giving the
patient the opportunity to gain information regarding her illness, the physician might
preface his discussion with the following:
There is some information about your treatment that you may wish to
know, and I will tell you about it if you like. There's a chance that this
information may upset you, and if you'd rather that I not go into details,
please say so. And if you'd like, I'll discuss it with your spouse [or other
family member] instead.
See Meisel, supra note 14, at 468.
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For these reasons, a team approach would be beneficial to the patient. When
a patient does receive distressing news, a team approach including such
professionals as social workers and psychologists, would be most helpful in
the patient's adjustment. A dying patient needs someone to listen and
understand how he feels.249 Professionals need to be sensitive to the authority
and power they possess and listen to patients who are terminally ill.250
It is a commonly held assumption that telling patients they are terminally ill
invariably destroys "hope" and causes psychological and clinical harm.251 Such
an assumption is misguided.252 Hope is a powerful tool that is not often given
enough credit.253
A. The Pressure on Others When Information is Withheld from the Patient
Nondisclosure to a patient effects more than just the patient. It effects
everyone involved in that patient's care, including family members and other
professionals such as nurses. 254 The diagnosis of a terminal illness, and the
"tippy-toeing" around a dying patient that accompanies it, are sources of
isolation and loneliness for the patient and others.255
When the responsible physician persists in efforts to conceal the truth from
a patient, consulting physicians, nurses and social workers involved may feel
as though they cannot fully discharge their duties until the patient has been
told the truth.256 For example, if a family has not allowed disclosure to the
patient, and the doctor has honored that request, the patient may be denied
adequate comfort measures.257 The person who will suffer in such a situation
is the patient.258
2 49See High, supra note 2, at 8.
250Id. at 9.
2 51 d. at 7.
2 52 1d.
2 53 1d.
2 54Nurses may witness and hear their patient's deepest anxieties, fears, and personal
secrets. See High, supra note 2, at 8.
255 Id. at 8.
256 See Freedman, supra note 6, at 572.
257 For instance, one example used in a recent article was "You can't give my mother
morphine or she'll know her condition is grave." Id. at 573.
258 With older children and adolescents, discomfort is most often allayed by
acquainting the patient as fully as possible with his condition, what will happen to him,
and how he can become actively involved in his own case. BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD
PSYCHIATRY: THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTIONS368 (Saul I. Harrison ed. 1979). Nondisclosure,
even if justified, cannot be carried out without a significant alteration in the normal
patterns of team communication. See Sigman, supra note 135, at 766. Such a conspiracy
may have an effect on collective care givers that negatively impacts on morale and care
provision. Id.
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B. Nondisclosure's Harm to the Patient
While the disclosure of a terminal illness will weigh heavily on the patient's
mind, the patient could receive certain treatments which would make his
day-to-day quality of life more pleasant. Obviously, with a terminal illness, the
patient will die. The true question is how he will spend his remaining
days-making plans, saying good-bye and being as comfortable as possible;
or being kept in the dark and, most commonly, in pain. In such cases, great
injury is added to the insult of withholding the truth from the patient. The
"dignity of the patient.., and the opportunity to arrange one's affairs dictate
that the patient should be told of his condition."25 9 The potential harm that
accompanies the withholding of information from a terminally ill patient
requires that the patient be dealt with honestly and openly, as they deserve.
C. Mind/Body Medicine and its Effect on Terminal Illness
Evidence is mounting that mind/body techniques may not only improve
one's quality of life, particularly for someone facing a serious illness, but
actually affect the course of the disease itself.260 "Mind/Body Medicine" is an
approach that sees the mind-our thoughts and emotions-as having a central
impact on the body's health. 261
One basic tenet of mind/body medicine is that it is best to treat the whole
person.26 2 Another tenet suggests that people can be active participants in their
own health care and may be able to prevent disease or shorten its course by
taking steps to manage their own psychological states.263 Evidence is growing
which shows that an individual's state of mind can effect physical health. 264
Mind/Body approaches can help reduce the severity and frequency of some
medical symptoms. 265
It is quite likely that mind/body approaches can greatly improve the quality
of life for patients with terminal illnesses such as cancer.26 6 Relaxation
methods, hypnosis, psychotherapy and support groups have contributed to
helping cancer patients deal effectively with their fears and anxieties about
25 9 See Notes, supra note 5 at 1658.
260MIND BODY MEDICINE: HOW TO USE YOUR MIND FOR BETTER HEALTH 4 (Daniel
Coleman & Joel Gurin eds., 1993) [hereinafter MIND BODY MEDICINE].
2 6 1 d. at 5.
262Id.
263 Id.
26 4See MIND BODY MEDICINE, supra note 260.
265 d. For instance, mind/body medicine can make chronic headaches less frequent,
reduce the nausea that accompanies chemotherapy, or help speed recovery from a
surgical procedure. Id.
266 d. at 15.
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their disease and the horrific treatments they must take.26 7 Although these
treatment methods will not necessarily extend the life of the cancer patient,268
they have shown great potential for improving the quality of life and
decreasing the pain and symptoms for people with various chronic diseases.
269
The physical and emotional risks of such treatments are minimal, while
potential benefits are high.270 There is still great debate over the extent to which
the mind can influence the body, but experience has confirmed the observation
that what goes on in the mind of a patient is at least as important as what goes
on inside the body.2 71
Unfortunately, if a patient is not given any information about his disease,
many of these options would be closed to the patient. A patient cannot benefit
from a cancer support group if he does not attend the meetings. And a patient
obviously will not be attending any meetings if he is unaware of the fact that
he does indeed have cancer. If a patient is dealt with without reserve, the above
options can be most helpful in the treatment of his or her terminal illness and
the patient's state of mind can be an integral part of the strive for comfort.
D. Group Decision-making in Regards to Disclosures and Services
Rendered to the Patient
When investigating the possibility of cancer, a physician must be aware of
the patient's emotional state.2 72 If the physician is unsure about the patient's
ability to handle the diagnosis, involving the family and consulting a
psychiatrist may be in order.2 73 By sharing the responsibility of deciding
whether or not to make a full disclosure, the doctor can use the input of other
professionals in weighing the risk and benefit ratio of truth-telling.
Some commentators have suggested that it would be "appropriate to provide
a regular forum for more input and dialogue in individual situations and to
allow the responsibilities of such judgments to be shared."274 One such forum
might be an "Ethics Committee" comprised of doctors, social workers,
attorneys and theologians.275 Such committees would review individual
situations of ethical dilemma and provide assistance and safeguards for both
26 7See MIND BODY MEDIcINE, supra note 260, at 15.
268 Mind/Body treatments should not be used in place of conventional treatments for
diseases. They should be part of a well-rounded overall treatment program. See MIND
BODY MEDICINE, supra note 260, at 18.
2 6 9 1d. at 17.
2701d.
271Id. at 21.
272 See Boverman, supra note 100, at 1307.
273Id.
274 See Teel, supra note 157, at 8.
275 1d. at 9.
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the patients and their medical caregivers. 276 Such advisory committees diffuse
the responsibility for making certain moral or ethical judgments and encourage
a full discovery of all options available to a particular patient.277
However, there are certain disadvantages to the group decision-making
process. The first problem is time. Obviously, the more people involved in a
decision, the longer it takes to reach a decision. Also, the committee might
experience some opposition from doctors and the families of the various
patients under discussion. Some believe the involvement of such a group is an
imposition on their independent judgment. However, these committees
usually serve in strictly an advisory capacity. Therefore, doctors should not feel
threatened and should take advantage of their input, for the patient's sake.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since "the physician-patient relationship involves an element of trust and
confidence," "obligations of good faith require the [doctor] to make the fullest
possible disclosure concerning risks of any proposed action which may result
in injury to the patient."278 When offering truth, doctors must recognize that
the patient's choices should be respected not because they agree with the
patient's choices, but simply because those are the patient's choices. 2 79
The very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent] is every
man's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for him
are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or perverted
his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession, or even
of the community, so long as any distortion falls short of what the law
regards as incompetency.
280
"Only the patient sufficiently knows his ... capacity for pain and suffering,
future business and social plans, and religious beliefs to [best] evaluate . ., a
particular treatment" and the risks which accompany it.281
A decision to withhold information from a terminally ill patient fails to
consider the interests of the patient and his family in receiving information so
they might prepare for the future. Of course, the patient will react negatively
to the word "cancer." But the patient still ought to be told as much as possible
regarding the nature of his cancer, and the nature of the operation and/or
treatments to be received.282 Most doctors are accustomed to telling patients
2 761d.
277Id.
2 78See Smith, supra note 86, at 350.
2 79See Freedman, supra note 6, at 573.
2802 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (2d ed. Supp. 1968)
281Notes, supra note 5, at 1646.
2 82 0ne strong supporter of truth telling went so far as to say that"a claim that a patient
cannot bear to be told the truth is an insult to the patient. ... even persons who are
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they have cancer and know how to handle the varied patient reactions to such
news.
283
It has repeatedly been asserted that the disclosure of such information as
"prognosis" in a terminal illness is followed by fear and despondency which
may lead the patient to suicide.284 In actuality, however, the incidence of
depression and suicide in cancer patients and the relationship of such reactions
to the disclosure of such information is not known.285 "There are few
documented harmful effects of disclosure and [numerous] proved benefits." 286
The therapeutic privilege is a controversial exception and the law is not
entirely clear as to the extent of the privilege.287 The therapeutic privilege
exception to the informed consent doctrine may tend to legitimate the
physician's natural aversion to disclosing unpleasant information to a patient.
It should, therefore, be strictly circumscribed in its scope so as to avoid
swallowing the general obligation of disclosure.
The disclosure of prognosis information, including life expectancy estimates,
should be included when making a full disclosure. Doctors tend to give less
and more vague information about prognosis, citing its uncertainty and lesser
relevance to future actions as their reasons. 288 Although this type of prediction
is obviously an inexact science, it is still valuable to the particular patient in his
or her decision-making. It is virtually impossible for a doctor to tell a patient
"you have X weeks left." A general range or some particular case examples,
however, would serve the purpose well. This is particularly true when, such as
in the case of Arato v. Avedon,289 the patient specifically requests to be told when
their illness becomes terminal or incurable. The therapeutic privilege should
never be employed to override a competent patient's expressed wishes.290 As
one doctor remarked, "[bly explaining diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment
options to the patient, I was creating the basis for freedom: ... freedom to make
suffering from severe impairments, physical and mental, have the ability to make
choices that effect their destiny." David Morris, Truth-Telling in Medicine, 247 JAMA 2659
(1982) (Letters Section).
283 See Freedman, supra note 6, at 573.
284 See Oken, supra note 3, at 1125.
2851d. at 1126.
286 See Novack, supra note 142, at 2984. Such benefits include improved quality of life
and time for preparation of business affairs. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
287 See Botkin, supra note 49, at 900.
288 N. T. Miyaji, The Power of Compassion: Truth-Telling Among American Doctors in the
Care of Dying Patients, 36 Soc. Sci. MED. 249 (1993).
28911 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169 (1992).
290 See Botkin, supra note 49, at 900.
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informed choices. 291 Including prognosis in a timely disclosure, allows the
patient and his family time to prepare themselves emotionally and accept the
impending death.292 The alternatives in a situation of terminal illness are not
living or dying-death is inevitable. But there are some things worse than
dying, such as dying in silence293 because you were never given the
opportunity to talk about your life, illness, and pending death. By withholding
information about a terminal illness, the patient's right to self-determination is
compromised unnecessarily.
The principle behind the informed consent doctrine is that patients should
be able to participate in decision-making concerning their health. Patient
participation is an integral part of the doctor-patient relationship. To safeguard
the autonomy and interests of both the patient and the physician,
decision-making in medicine must become a joint undertaking.
DENISE ANN DICKERSON
29 lAntonella Surbone, Truth Telling to the Patient, 268 JAMA 1661 (1992) (Letters
Section).
292 See Annas, supra note 26, at 62.
293 See Freedman, supra note 6, at 574.
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